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Abstract
Reciprocity is probably one of the most debated theories in evolutionary research. After more than 40 years of research, some
scientists conclude that reciprocity is an almost uniquely human trait mainly because it is cognitively demanding. Others,
however, conclude that reciprocity is widespread and of great importance to many species. Yet, it is unclear how these species
reciprocate, given its apparent cognitive complexity. Therefore, our aim was to unravel the psychological processes underlying
reciprocity. By bringing together findings from studies investigating different aspects of reciprocity, we show that reciprocity is a
rich concept with different behavioural strategies and cognitive mechanisms that require very different psychological processes.
We reviewed evidence from three textbook examples, i.e. the Norway rat, common vampire bat and brown capuchin monkey,
and show that the species use different strategies and mechanisms to reciprocate. We continue by examining the psychological
processes of reciprocity. We show that the cognitive load varies between different forms of reciprocity. Several factors can lower
the memory demands of reciprocity such as distinctiveness of encounters, memory of details and network size. Furthermore,
there are different information operation systems in place, which also vary in their cognitive load due to assessing the number of
encounters and the quality and quantity of help. We conclude that many species possess the psychological processes to show
some form of reciprocity. Hence, reciprocity might be a widespread phenomenon that varies in terms of strategies and
mechanisms.
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Introduction
The theory of natural selection predicts that only those behav-
iours evolve that increase the actor’s own survival and repro-
ductive success (Darwin, 1859). Paradoxically, many species
provide benefits to others, for instance, by providing care, food,
information and support to con- and heterospecifics (Dugatkin,
1997). Cooperation is such a widespread phenomenon that we
find evidence across the animal kingdom, ranging from bacteria
(Crespi, 2001) to humans (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). The
paradox of the evolution of cooperation was resolved for inter-
actions between related individuals, i.e. by helping kin, shared
genes are more likely to be transmitted to the next generations,
which is in the interest of the helper (Hamilton, 1964). Still, the
kin selection theory cannot explain the frequent occurrence of
cooperation among unrelated individuals. Trivers (1971) of-
fered a solution: reciprocal cooperation, i.e. helping those that
were cooperative before. While several theoretical models have
shown that cooperation can evolve via reciprocity (reviewed in
Nowak, 2012), the theory has faced considerable resistance
(e.g. Clutton-Brock, 2009; Connor, 2010; Hammerstein,
2003; Russell & Wright, 2009; Sánchez-Amaro & Amici,
2015; Stevens, Cushman, & Hauser, 2005; Stevens & Hauser,
2004, 2005; West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007).
It is a central problem of the theory of reciprocity, and
explaining cooperation more generally (especially among
non-kin), that the extent to which behavioural exchanges are
based on reciprocity is unknown. This problem is tightly
linked to the cognitive underpinnings of reciprocity.
Researchers, who assume reciprocity to be highly cognitively
demanding, came to the conclusion that reciprocity is virtually
absent in non-human animals (Amici et al., 2014; Clements &
Stephens, 1995; Hauser, McAuliffe, & Blake, 2009; Pelé,
Dufour, Thierry, & Call, 2009; Pelé, Thierry, Call, &
Dufour, 2010; Sánchez-Amaro & Amici, 2015; Stephens,
McLinn, & Stevens, 2002; Stevens et al., 2005; Stevens &
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Hauser, 2004). In contrast, researchers who assume that reci-
procity varies in its cognitive load came to the opposite con-
clusion that reciprocity is widespread (Brosnan & de Waal,
2002; Brosnan, Salwiczek, & Bshary, 2010; Carter, 2014;
Freidin, Carballo, & Bentosela, 2017; Melis & Semmann,
2010; Raihani & Bshary, 2011; Schino & Aureli, 2009,
2010b; Taborsky, Frommen, & Riehl, 2016). Here, we argue
that the debate can be enriched and potentially resolved by
identifying and discussing the concrete psychological process-
es of all different forms of reciprocity by using and incorpo-
rating findings from different lines of research. Although sev-
eral authors have discussed the various mechanisms that may
underlie reciprocal exchanges between individuals (e.g.
Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; Schino & Aureli, 2010b), as far
as we know, no attempt has been made to systematically relate
those mechanisms to the psychological processes underlying
them. Our aim in this article is to bring attention to this issue as
a necessary step towards the ultimate goal of elucidating the
psychological processes underlying different forms of reci-
procity. Accordingly, our article is organised as follows:
First, we summarise different behavioural strategies and cog-
nitive mechanisms enabling reciprocity. Second, we apply this
framework to three textbook examples of reciprocity, i.e. the
Norway rat (Rattus norvegicus), the common vampire bat
(Desmodus rotundus) and the brown capuchin monkey
(Cebus apella). Third, we discuss the crucial behavioural,
cognitive and emotional components enabling different forms
of reciprocity. These psychological processes will allow us to
draw clear predictions under which conditions reciprocity is
likely to evolve. Finally, we provide concrete examples for
prospective studies to better understand the evolutionary and
psychological origins of reciprocity.
Different forms of reciprocity
Trivers (1971) defined reciprocity as one individual selective-
ly providing helpful acts with another individual that will pro-
vide benefits in return. Hereby, helpful acts are costly to the
actor and beneficial only to the recipient. There are various
examples of evidence for individuals that exchange help con-
ditional on the partner’s previous helping level across the an-
imal kingdom (reviewed in Díaz-Muñoz, DuVal, Krakauer, &
Lacey, 2014; Dugatkin, 1997; Hemelrijk & Luteijn, 1998;
Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013; Schino, 2007; Schino & Aureli,
2008, 2010c; Taborsky, 1994; Taborsky et al., 2016).
Evidence ranges from bacteria (Inglis, West, & Buckling,
2014) to humans (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). However, such
conditional help has not always been termed reciprocity be-
cause some authors suggest restricting the term to situations in
which individuals are able to cognitively compute cost-benefit
analyses (reviewed in Carter, 2014).
We think restricting the term reciprocity to complex com-
putations, i.e. keeping track and weighing costs and benefits
when helping other, is problematic for at least three reasons.
First, humans, who are often regarded as the only species
capable of reciprocity, rarely reciprocate favours by calculat-
ing costs and benefits (Bowles & Gintis, 2011, pp. 186-194;
Carter, 2014). Furthermore, when defining reciprocity, Trivers
did not restrict the term to animals that are capable of calcu-
lating such cost-benefit analyses. In fact, he suggested that
emotions might be guiding human reciprocity (Trivers,
1971). He proposed that (1) sympathy might be the motivator
to help, (2) gratitude the measure of helpfulness, (3) guilt the
reason to not cheat and (4) trust the mechanism of partner
choice. Restricting the term reciprocity to complex calcula-
tions would hence also restrict human reciprocity to only a
few situations, i.e. mainly business relationships, which does
not resemble the everyday usage of the term (cf. Cambridge
Dictionary). Second, restricting the term to complex calcula-
tions prevents us from understanding the general explanatory
power of the theory of reciprocity. Many animals cooperate
conditionally with kin and non-kin (see above). However,
these results have been largely neglected because the focus
of the current debate lies on explaining why reciprocity is rare
or cannot exist (e.g. André & Nolfi, 2016; Hammerstein,
2003; Russell & Wright, 2009). Third, restricting reciprocity
to few instances prevents us also from understanding its evo-
lutionary origins. Studying conditional cooperation in various
species may eventually inform us about important questions,
such as how many times reciprocity evolved, under which
condition it evolved and how it is maintained.
For these reasons, we define reciprocal interactions as
Bindividuals exchanging goods and services that are contingent
on each other^, according to Trivers’ original definition
(Trivers, 1971). This definition makes no assumptions about
the underlying mechanisms. Instead, this definition allows us
to investigate different mechanisms enabling individuals to re-
ciprocate (please see our glossary in the Online Supplementary
Material, S1, for different forms of reciprocity). Importantly,
different lines of research have focussed on different aspects
of reciprocity, which have not yet been aligned, although they
can greatly inform each other, as we outline below.
One line of research has focussed mostly on describing
conditional strategies in the framework of reciprocity (e.g.
Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Taborsky et al., 2016; West, El
Mouden, & Gardner, 2011). A strategy is a behavioural deci-
sion rule that is dependent, in the case of reciprocity, on the
partner’s behaviour (cf. Bshary & Bergmüller, 2008; Laland,
2004). There are at least three forms of reciprocal strategies if
by-products are excluded, like pseudo-reciprocity, i.e. an au-
tomated response to help without the possibility of cheating
(Connor, 1986). First, in direct reciprocity, individuals help
only those that helped them previously, i.e. BI help you be-
cause you helped me^ (Trivers, 1971). Second, indirect
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reciprocity relies on public information where individuals help
individuals that were observed to be helpful towards others,
i.e. BI help you because you helped someone else^
(Alexander, 1987). Third, generalised reciprocity is based
on a general increase in the motivation to help due to a random
experience of help, i.e. BI help you because I was helped by
someone^ (Boyd & Richerson, 1989). While these behaviour-
al strategies describe useful means that can be tested empiri-
cally and theoretically, they give us little insight into how such
rules are achieved.
Another line of research has focussed mostly on mecha-
nisms that may enable reciprocity (e.g. Brosnan & de Waal,
2002; Schino & Aureli, 2010b). A mechanism describes the
basal cause of a behaviour or a strategy, which can be cogni-
tive in the case of reciprocity (Bateson & Laland, 2013;
Tinbergen, 1963). At least four mechanisms have been de-
scribed, if again by-products are excluded, like symmetry-
based reciprocity, i.e. a response based on symmetrical traits
rather than experienced help (de Waal & Luttrell, 1988; but
see Campennì & Schino, 2016). First, probably the least cog-
nitively demanding form of reciprocity is hard-wired
reciprocity (Schino & Aureli, 2017). This is a fixed response
to provide help immediately upon the receipt of help. It is most
likely confined to distinct settings that do not involve a time
delay, partner choice or the flexible use of different commod-
ities. Thus, this mechanism is different from all other mecha-
nisms that are flexible and require some form of encoding and
processing information. Second, attitudinal reciprocity re-
quires a cognitive decision with a minimum of information.
Here an attitude, i.e. a tag based on the last encounter, is
associated with a cooperation partner (Brosnan & de Waal,
2002; de Waal & Brosnan, 2006). This mechanism does not
require the memory of the exact levels of help. Instead a gen-
eral tag, such as Bthe partner was nice^ is sufficient. An im-
portant feature of attitudinal reciprocity is that received help
will be reciprocated in the next cooperative situation, i.e.
short-term reciprocity (Jaeggi, de Groot, Stevens, & van
Schaik, 2013). Third, emotion-based reciprocity acts on lon-
ger time spans. For that, individuals help selectively those
partners with which they associate positive emotions, for ex-
ample when being socially bonded (Schino & Aureli, 2009).
Because emotional bonds develop as a consequence of help
received, the donated help is likely to be returned. This mech-
anism leads to balanced relationships in which given and re-
ceived favours are correlated over long time frames, i.e. long-
term reciprocity. Finally, calculated reciprocity is probably the
most cognitively demanding mechanism because individuals
calculate how much they need to help another individual
based on the memory of the amount of help received by this
individual (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; de Waal & Brosnan,
2006). Similar to attitudinal reciprocity, calculated reciprocity
leads to short-term reciprocity in which provided help is de-
pendent on previously received help.
These different forms of reciprocity illustrate that there is
probably not ‘one form’ of reciprocity (Table 1; see also the
glossary Online SupplementaryMaterial, S1). Yet, many stud-
ies did not differentiate between them; consequently, we thus
lack knowledge on the use of different strategies and mecha-
nisms in many species.
Three textbook examples of reciprocity
Next, we examine evidence of different forms of reciprocity in
the light of their behavioural strategies and cognitive mecha-
nisms in three textbook examples, i.e. Norway rats, common
vampire bats and brown capuchin monkeys (summarised in
the Online Supplemental Material, Table S2). We chose these
examples as they provide the most comprehensive data sets of
reciprocity in comparison to other species. At the same time,
these studies have also attracted criticism and doubts have
been raised whether the species’ ability to reciprocate might
be accounted by alternative explanations (e.g. Davies, Krebs,
&West, 2012; McAuliffe & Thornton, 2015; Paolucci, Conte,
& Di Tosto, 2006; Stevens & Hauser, 2005; Zentall, 2015). In
recent years, however, initial findings in these species have
been validated, refined and extended by using various para-
digms and by testing the raised concerns (see below). Thereby,
these three species have become the best investigated study
systems of reciprocity to date. Therefore, we think they pro-
vide a useful starting point of investigating the evolutionary
and psychological origins of reciprocity.
Norway rat
Wild Norway rats live in large multi-female, multi-male col-
onies, which may be composed of more than 150 individuals
(Davis, 1953). They frequently interact with related and unre-
lated colony members and form dominance hierarchies
(Calhoun, 1979). They engage in various social behaviours
like alarm calls, food sharing, huddling, social grooming and
social play (reviewed in Schweinfurth, under review).
Norway rats have been repeatedly shown to reciprocate
help in different paradigms (reviewed in Schweinfurth in
press). The most commonly used paradigm is the food-
exchange setup. Here one rat, i.e. the cooperating partner,
provides food via a movable platform to the focal rat (cf.
Rutte & Taborsky, 2007). After a delay of up to six days, the
roles are exchanged and the focal rat can provide food to its
previous partner (e.g. Stieger, Schweinfurth, & Taborsky,
2017). To ensure that food donations by the focal rats are
based on the previous help by a partner, focal rats are always
also tested with a defecting partner that did not provide food to
them. Several controls have been conducted to ensure that, for
instance, differential food intake, activity, copying, or other
factors cannot explain their helping levels (for a discussion,
Learn Behav
see Dolivo, Rutte, & Taborsky, 2016; Schweinfurth &
Taborsky, 2018b).
Rats help each other reciprocally according to at least two
behavioural strategies. First, they help each other according to
direct reciprocity. Female and male rats donate food to others
reciprocally by providing more food to cooperating than
defecting partners (Li & Wood, 2017; Rutte & Taborsky,
2008 ; Schneeberger, Die tz , & Taborsky, 2012 ;
Schweinfurth, Aeschbacher, Santi, & Taborsky, 2019;
Schweinfurth & Taborsky, 2016, 2017, 2018c; Simones,
2007; Viana, Gordo, Sucena, & Moita, 2010). In addition,
female rats apply direct reciprocity when grooming each other
(Schweinfurth, Stieger, & Taborsky, 2017). Such reciprocal
allogrooming has significant fitness benefits, as reciprocal
groomers live longer and suffer less mammary tumours in
the lab (Yee, Cavigelli, Delgado, & McClintock, 2008).
Finally, female rats also exchange allogrooming for food and
vice versa (Schweinfurth & Taborsky, 2018b; Stieger et al.,
2017). Besides direct reciprocity, female, but not male, rats
engage in generalised reciprocity (Rutte & Taborsky, 2007,
2008; Schweinfurth et al., 2019). In a direct comparison, how-
ever, female rats donate over 20% more food to a partner with
whom they have interacted, showing that direct reciprocity
generates higher levels of cooperation than generalised reci-
procity (Rutte & Taborsky, 2008).
What is the mechanism underlying reciprocity in Norway
rats? First, hard-wired reciprocity cannot explain reciprocity
among Norway rats because they tailor their help to the part-
ner’s helping quality (Dolivo & Taborsky, 2015) and the part-
ner’s need (Márquez, Rennie, Costa, & Moita, 2015;
Schneeberger et al., 2012; Schneeberger, Röder, & Taborsky,
submitted; Schweinfurth & Taborsky, 2018a). Furthermore,
rats reciprocate help by using different actions (Schweinfurth
& Taborsky, 2017) and different commodities (Schweinfurth
& Taborsky, 2018b; Stieger et al., 2017), making a fixed re-
sponse unlikely. Second, emotion-based reciprocity is also
unlikely to explain reciprocity in Norway rats. They seem
not to form social bonds even after being housed together
for more than one and a half years (Schweinfurth,
Neuenschwander, et al., 2017). They do not accumulate social
information with their partners, but rather use the last experi-
ence (Schweinfurth & Taborsky, under review; Stieger et al.,
2017). Third, there is no evidence for calculated reciprocity
either. The amounts of received and immediate given help are
not matched in male and female rats (Schweinfurth et al.,
2019; Schweinfurth & Taborsky, under review). This is in line
with their numerical ability being limited to six items, which is
below the amount of grooming bouts they are known to re-
ciprocate (cf. Davis & Bradford, 1986; Schweinfurth, Stieger,
et al., 2017).
Reciprocity in Norway rats is probably best explained by
attitudinal reciprocity (reviewed in Schweinfurth, in press).
Rats form attitudes that are based on the last encounter withTa
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a partner (Schweinfurth & Taborsky, under review).
Importantly, using the last encounters for reciprocity is not a
result of memory interference as rats have been shown to
memorise several partners (Kettler, Schweinfurth, &
Taborsky, under review), several food preferences (Galef,
Lee, & Whiskin, 2005) and several unique events (Panoz-
Brown et al., 2016) despite a long time delay with potentially
disruptive experiences. Importantly, attitudes are linked to re-
ceived cooperation and not just the product of ‘feeling good’,
as a study showed in which rats refused to reciprocate food
donations that they received in the presence of, but not by,
another rat (Schmid, Schneeberger, & Taborsky, 2017).
Attitudes can be generalised to other partners because female
rats show not only direct but also generalised reciprocity
(Rutte & Taborsky, 2008). In addition, attitudes are not binary
responses, like a cooperator or defector tag, but can be mod-
ulated by different values of help. For instance, rats groom a
partner more often that has provided food to them than vice
versa, suggesting that one food item is valued more than one
allogrooming bout (Schweinfurth & Taborsky, 2018b). In ad-
dition, rats are more likely to provide oat flakes to a partner
that provided them with banana pieces, i.e. highly preferred
food, than with carrot pieces, i.e. less preferred food (Dolivo
& Taborsky, 2015).
Common vampire bat
Vampire bats, which include three species, feed exclusively on
the blood of other mammals (Dalquest, 1955). Common vam-
pire bats live in small groups of eight to twelve individuals
(Wilkinson, 1984). Such groups roost together in large colo-
nies, ranging from a few individuals to over 2,000, whereby
females often move between different roosts (Wilkinson,
1988). Groups usually consist of one male and its female
harem or male bachelor groups (Wilkinson, 1985b, 1985a).
Vampire bats are the only bats that regurgitate food to donate it
to others (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013a). Besides food dona-
tions, vampire bats show high levels of allogrooming com-
pared to other bats (Carter & Leffer, 2015). In addition, they
adopt and nurse offspring of other colony members (Carter &
Wilkinson, 2013a; Wilkinson, Carter, Bohn, & Adams, 2016).
Common vampire bats regurgitate blood to donate it to
others. Early studies used numerous observations of these bats
in their natural habitat and found that given and received help
is correlated and reciprocated (Denault & McFarlane, 1995;
Wilkinson, 1984). Recently, these findings have been replicat-
ed (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c) and extended by several con-
trolled experiments with captive bats (reviewed in Carter &
Wilkinson, 2013b). In several experiments, individual focal
bats were removed from their colony and fasted for one day.
After the hungry focal individual was returned to its group, all
food donations to this individual were recorded. The focal
individuals received blood mostly from partners, which they
had provided food before (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c).
They mainly donate blood with conspecifics with which
they roost together frequently but that do not necessarily be-
long to their group (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013b). Food dona-
tions are more common between females, which form stable
social bonds, but males have also been shown to regurgitate
blood for others in the laboratory (Carter & Wilkinson,
2013b). Such donations are highly valuable to recipients be-
cause vampire bats die within two to three days without a
blood meal (Freitas, Welker, Millan, & Pinheiro, 2003;
McNab, 1973). They reciprocate blood with both kin and
non-kin, whereby donations are better explained by reciprocity
than by relatedness (Carter &Wilkinson, 2013c). Extending the
network to non-kin has been shown to be beneficial for the bats
because when their main association partner was temporarily
removed, those that had more associations with unrelated roost
mates received more food donations (Carter, Farine, &
Wilkinson, 2017; Carter & Wilkinson, 2015b). Besides ex-
changing blood, the bats also exchange allogrooming for food
according to direct reciprocity (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c;
Wilkinson, 1986). In contrast, they seem not to use generalised
reciprocity (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c).
What is the mechanism underlying reciprocity in common
vampire bats? First, hard-wired reciprocity cannot explain rec-
iprocity since the bats exchange different services, like
allogrooming with food (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c). In ad-
dition, reciprocity is limited to few closely bonded individuals
(Carter et al., 2017), which makes automatic responses to
received help unlikely. Second, attitudes based on recent en-
counters seem to be unable to generate reciprocity because
reciprocity can only be detected over long time frames or
when socially bonded bats are observed in captivity
(reviewed in Carter & Wilkinson, 2013b; Wilkinson et al.,
2016). Third, calculated reciprocity is an unlikely explanation
for their reciprocity. Like Norway rats, common vampire bats
do not match the actual amount of received and given help
(Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c), which makes reciprocity based
on calculations unlikely. However, little is known about their
cognitive capabilities that could elucidate the underlying cog-
nitive processes that they use (for the only studies of
examining cognitive skills, see Ratcliffe, Fenton, & Galef,
2003; Vrtilek, Carter, Patriquin, Page, & Ratcliffe, 2018).
Reciprocity in vampire bats is probably best explained by
emotion-based reciprocity. Rather than considering the last
encounters as Norway rats do, the bats reciprocate help over
long time spans (see above). They form enduring social bonds
with kin and non-kin, which can last over more than ten years
(Carter et al., 2017; Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c, 2015b;
Wilkinson, 1985b, 1985a, 1986). Importantly, their food-
sharing network closely mirrors their social-bonding network
(Carter & Wilkinson, 2013c). This suggests that social bonds
play a crucial role in their decisions to help conspecifics. In
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line with this, the amounts of donated blood and grooming are
linked to oxytocin levels, which suggests an emotional com-
ponent in the decision to reciprocate (Carter & Wilkinson,
2015a).
Brown capuchin monkey
Brown capuchin monkeys, also called tufted or black-capped
capuchin monkeys, live in colonies of up to 30 individuals
(Carosi, Linn, &Visalberghi, 2005). They show a distinct linear
hierarchy in both sexes (Janson, 1985). Further, their breeding
system can be described as either one-male, multi-female or
multi-male, multi-female (Carosi et al., 2005). These monkeys
show various social behaviours, such as alarm calls, collabora-
tive hunting, food sharing, social grooming and social play
(Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Fegan, 2009; Izawa, 1980).
Brown capuchin monkeys are probably the best-known
example for reciprocity. Reciprocity has been demonstrated
repeatedly by using various methods under controlled captive
conditions. For instance, they donate food to others by
handing over or dropping food close to a partner in an adjacent
compartment, who will return the favour in the same way (de
Waal, 2000; see de Waal, 1997, for a detailed ethogram of the
donations). To ensure that food donations are a product of
received help and partner directed, several control conditions
have been conducted with partners of differing relationship
quality or partners being absent (reviewed in de Waal &
Brosnan, 2006). In addition to these active and passive food
transfers, the monkeys also reciprocate food donations by
using various less intuitive testing apparatuses, i.e. bar pulling,
joysticks, lever boxes and token exchanges (Hattori,
Kuroshima, & Fujita, 2005; Mendres & de Waal, 2000;
Parrish, Brosnan, & Beran, 2015; Suchak & de Waal, 2012).
All the tests described above investigated direct reciprocity.
In addition, capuchin monkeys show generalised reciprocity
(Leimgruber et al., 2014). As far as we are aware, there has
been no published report of indirect reciprocity in brown ca-
puchin monkeys. However, they pay attention to third-party
interactions and are inclined to accept exchange offers from
humans that were observed to frequently reject such exchange
requests from other monkeys (Anderson, Kuroshima,
Takimoto, & Fujita, 2013). This might suggest indirect reci-
procity, but further studies are needed that directly test this
possibility.
What is the mechanism underlying reciprocity in brown
capuchin monkeys? In contrast to Norway rats and common
vampire bats, the mechanism of reciprocity among these mon-
keys is less obvious. The only mechanism that can be almost
certainly excluded is hard-wired reciprocity. When the mon-
keys help each other, they consider the quality of received
help (de Waal, 2000) and the quality of their relationship
(Sabbatini, De Bortoli Vizioli, Visalberghi, & Schino, 2012).
This makes a fixed response unlikely. Furthermore, calculated
reciprocity seems unlikely but possible because two studies
found that the amount of received and given help was corre-
lated, which suggests memory and score keeping of previous
helpful events to some degree (e.g. de Waal, 1997, 2000). In
fact, capuchin monkeys have been shown to add items to a
pool of non-visible items, suggesting that they can keep track
of multiple food donations, which is needed for calculations
(Beran, Evans, Leidghty, Harris, & Rice, 2008). However, not
all studies found such a correlation between received and giv-
en help (Brosnan, Freeman, & deWaal, 2006; Sabbatini et al.,
2012; Suchak & deWaal, 2012). Finally, studies set out to test
for calculated reciprocity found no evidence (Amici et al.,
2014; Pelé et al., 2010). It should be noted, however, that
the monkeys in these studies did not pass the task-
understanding condition. Therefore, additional studies on cal-
culated reciprocity are needed.
There is less ambiguous evidence for the two remaining
mechanisms underlying reciprocity. There is good evidence
for attitudinal reciprocity (reviewed in Brosnan & de Waal,
2002; de Waal & Brosnan, 2006). In contrast to common
vampire bats and in accordance with Norway rats, brown ca-
puchin monkeys show short-term reciprocity (see above).
Furthermore, they reciprocate help with familiar and unfamil-
iar partners (Suchak & de Waal, 2012), which suggests short-
term attitudes rather than long-term bonds being the reason to
help. However, there is also good evidence for emotion-based
reciprocity. In a direct comparison, the monkeys were more
likely to allow access to their food to a socially bonded indi-
vidual than to an individual that provided food to them before
(Sabbatini et al., 2012). This study suggests that the monkeys
probably cooperate over long time frames and an emotional
bond can becomemore important that attitudinal reciprocity in
a partner choice situation. This is in line with observations
from the wild that showed evidence for long-term reciprocity
(di Bitetti, 1997; Izawa, 1980; Schino, di Giuseppe, &
Visalberghi, 2009a; Schino, Di Giuseppe, & Visalberghi,
2009b; Tiddi, Aureli, Polizzi di Sorrentino, Janson, &
Schino, 2011; Tiddi, Aureli, & Schino, 2012).
Hence, reciprocity in brown capuchin monkeys is probably
a result of attitudinal reciprocity and emotion-based reciproc-
ity. While attitudinal reciprocity cannot explain the selective
helping of bonded individuals, emotion-based reciprocity can-
not explain the repeatedly observed short-term reciprocity.
Still, the results must not be contradictory, and both may
explain some aspects of cooperation in these monkeys. For
instance, Sabbatini et al. (2012) found that the same monkeys
show short-term reciprocity in dyads, but long-term reciproc-
ity in trios. This is an interesting finding because it suggests
that individuals can possess multiple mechanisms to achieve
reciprocity. The same may apply to other species, although
this has not been studied extensively other than in humans.
Humans use different mechanisms to achieve different
forms of reciprocity. People employ a calculated reciprocity
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approach with unfamiliar (Andreoni & Miller, 1993; Gachter
& Falk, 2002) or business partners (Anderson, Hakansson, &
Johanson, 1994; Steidlmeier, 1999). If, however, it gets diffi-
cult tomemorise several events with a partner, people focus on
the attitude towards partners based on the last encounter
(Milinski & Wedekind, 1998). In contrast, we rarely use
short-term reciprocity when interacting with friends; instead,
we rely on emotional bonds based on long-term reciprocity
(reviewed in Massen, Sterck, & de Vos, 2010; Silk, 2003).
Overall, we help friends more than strangers (Gächter,
Kessler, & Königstein, 2011) because we trust them
(Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002; Majolo et al., 2013) and
expect them to return favours (Deutsch, 1975; Walker, 1995).
Interestingly, donations towards strangers can be increased by
applying oxytocin, which is associated with emotional bonds
(Zak, Stanton, & Ahmadi, 2007). In addition, the more often
strangers interact, the more trust is built up and the more they
are treated like friends (Gächter et al., 2011). This suggests
that we use multiple mechanisms that can transform into each
other rather than being static.
Psychological processes of reciprocity
We have shown above that different species show different
strategies that are enabled by different mechanisms. The psy-
chological processes of calculated reciprocity have been
discussed at length (e.g. Hauser, McAuliffe, & Blake, 2009;
Ramseyer, Pelé, Dufour, Chauvin, & Thierry, 2006; Russell &
Wright, 2009; Sánchez-Amaro & Amici, 2015; Stevens,
Cushman, & Hauser, 2005; Stevens & Gilby, 2004; Stevens
& Hauser, 2004, 2005). Stevens and colleagues (2004, 2005)
identified numerous possible cognitive challenges involved in
reciprocity in order to direct the right amount of help to the
correct partner. These challenges may include cheater detec-
tion, cheater punishment, cost-benefit computations, inhibito-
ry control, individual recognition, memory capacity, memory
decay, memory interference, numerical quantification, reputa-
tion recollection, temporal discounting, theory of mind and
time estimation. In contrast, the psychological processes of
other mechanisms have received uneven attention, even
though several authors have pointed out that reciprocity is
not necessarily cognitively demanding (e.g. Brosnan & de
Waal, 2002; Schino & Aureli, 2009). In fact the overemphasis
on calculated reciprocity is probably the reason why it is com-
monly assumed that reciprocity requires high cognitive de-
mands and thus is unlikely to occur in non-human animals
(see also Schino & Aureli, 2010a). Although this is the case
of calculated reciprocity, it does not apply to reciprocity in
general. Furthermore, different mechanisms have been largely
neglected in studies investigating different strategies and vice
versa, which is unfortunate because they can greatly comple-
ment and inform each other. Hence in this part, we aim to
integrate the different approaches in one framework and high-
light the psychological processes underlying different reci-
procity forms (summarised in Table 2). To understand the
psychological processes of reciprocal decisions, it is important
to note that the most basal components of such decisions are
memory, i.e. the encoding and retrieving of information, and
operations, i.e. processing the information to provide help.
Memory
If receiving and giving help takes place at the same time, e.-
g. simultaneous exchanges (MacDonald, Stewart, Stopka, &
Yamaguchi, 2000), or is a result of each other, e.g. immediate
exchanges (Kiers et al., 2011), no information needs to be
stored and memory is not essential. This is, for instance, the
case for hard-wired reciprocity and shows that memory is not
a prerequisite for reciprocity per se. In contrast, if there is a
delay between received and given help, memory is involved.
All reciprocity forms besides hard-wired reciprocity, are likely
to involve a time delay and thus require some form of mem-
ory. The longer the delay, the longer information needs to be
stored and the more likely such information is modified or
forgotten (Lind, Enquist, & Ghirlanda, 2015).
Memory has been suggested to constrain reciprocity in
many species (reviewed in Stevens et al., 2005; Stevens &
Table 2 Psychological processes associated with different reciprocity types
Strategy Perception Scene-
memory
Individual recognition Emotions Calculations Event-
memory
Hard-wired reciprocity Direct, generalised ✓
Attitudinal reciprocity Generalised ✓ ✓
Direct, indirect ✓ ✓ ✓
Emotion-based reciprocity Direct ✓ ✓ ✓
Calculated reciprocity Direct, (indirect) ✓ ✓ ✓ (✓)* ✓ ✓
*Emotions are not a pre-requisite for calculated reciprocity but may be an enhancing factor
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Hauser, 2004). For instance, the capacity to memorise several
partners and their cooperativeness over long intervals can be a
cognitive burden (Stevens, Volstorf, Schooler, & Rieskamp,
2011). Indeed, in a calculated reciprocity system, many details
of several encounters need to be associated to specific indi-
viduals in order to make an informed decision to help. Such
information is likely subject to memory decay due to delay or
distractions (e.g. Milinski & Wedekind, 1998). In addition,
interference, i.e. new information interferes with older infor-
mation, must be reduced.
In contrast to calculated reciprocity, attitudinal reciprocity
is tightly linked to this interference effect. Here, information is
always replaced by newer information, or in other words, the
most recent encounter is memorised better than previous en-
counters, i.e. recency effect (Raffel, 1936). Attitudes can be
acquired by classical conditioning. If an individual helps a
partner that reciprocates help, this partner might be encoded
as a conditioned stimulus because it provides rewarding help.
It is currently unclear how many partners in association with
the respective attitude can be remembered. For example, pi-
geons (Columba livia) have been shown to memorise 800–
1,200 associations, while baboons (Papio papio) could mem-
orise at least 3,500–5,000 associations after intensive and ex-
tended training (Fagot & Cook, 2006). These results suggest
that attitudinal reciprocity, which relies on simple associations
between a partner and an attitude, might lie within the cogni-
tive skillset of many animals even if several partners need to
be encoded. Potentially, both calculated and attitudinal reci-
procity might require even fewer memory demands when in-
teractions require only the memory of the level of cooperation
(generalised reciprocity), instead of the partner’s identity as-
sociated with their level of cooperation (direct and indirect
reciprocity).
Furthermore, in emotion-based reciprocity, memory de-
mands are even less likely to constrain reciprocity. First, the
amount of information that needs to be stored about specific
cooperation events can be drastically reduced, if individuals
base their decisions on emotions associated with a partner
because no information about specific encounters is needed
(Schino & Aureli, 2017). In fact, the emotional bond with a
partner might become an incentive cue. Bonds are based on
repeated cooperation and thus individuals might associate re-
ceived help with the bond strength. Eventually, helping close-
ly bonded partners might be perceived as more rewarding than
helping loosely bonded partners, which is a similar effect to
food tasting better when hungry, i.e. incentive learning
(reviewed in Berridge, 2001). Second, emotions have been
shown to enhance memory (Dolan, 2002; Kensinger, 2004).
For example, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are better at re-
membering pictures that show emotional scenes, such as fight-
ing, compared to neutral scenes, such as resting (Kano,
Tanaka, & Tomonaga, 2008). In addition, American crows
(Corvus brachyrhynchos) can remember dangerous people
after a single fearful encounter for more than two and a half
years (Marzluff, Walls, Cornell, Withey, & Craig, 2010).
Finally, common ravens (Corvus corax) distinguish non-
affiliated from affiliated conspecifics, with which they have
had a positive emotional bond, even after 3 years of separation
(Boeckle & Bugnyar, 2012). There have been some
pioneering studies investigating the interplay of cooperation
and emotions. For instance, chimpanzees that receive
allogrooming or food show an increase in urinary oxytocin
(Crockford et al., 2013; Wittig et al., 2014). Oxytocin is a
hormone that has been frequently linked to positive emotions
and increases generosity and reciprocity also in humans
(Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005; Zak
et al., 2007). Recent findings suggest, however, that the in-
crease in cooperativeness due to oxytocin may depend on the
individual’s baseline levels and social contexts (Bartz, Zaki,
Bolger, & Ochsner, 2011; Crockford, Deschner, Ziegler, &
Wittig, 2014; Romero, Onishi, & Hasegawa, 2016). Still, if
help is associated with emotions, the memory of such encoun-
ters might be enhanced. This may explain why many species
can reciprocate help over extended periods of time without
memory constraints (Freidin et al., 2017; Jaeggi et al.,
2013). It may also explain why common ravens, for instance,
are capable of remembering short prosocial encounters with
humans for more than a month (Müller, Massen, Bugnyar, &
Osvath, 2017). In addition to emotions, other factors are
known to increase or decrease memory, which we discuss
below.
Memory and distinctiveness
Helpful acts may be easier to memorise when they involve
emotional (see above), dramatic, rare or surprising situations
rather than routine situations. For example, we are better able
to recall the dinner menu we had last year in an exquisite
restaurant compared to what we cooked one week ago.
Likewise, individuals may better remember that they received
support in a rare fight than hearing yet another alarm call.
To the best of our knowledge, distinctiveness has not yet
been investigated in helping tasks, albeit evidence has been
demonstrated in other tasks. Pigeons, for instance, are less
likely to learn stimuli that are similar to each other and forget
them more quickly compared to distinctively different stimuli
(Kraemer, 1984). Similarly, apes and Norway rats memorise
more easily distinct compared to indistinct stimuli (e.g. Beran,
2011; Lewis, Call, & Berntsen, 2017; Reed & Richards,
1996).
Distinctiveness of encounters is likely to be of great impor-
tance for reciprocity forms that depend on exact information
of last encounters, such as calculated and attitudinal reciproc-
ity. In contrast emotion-based reciprocity is not dependent on
single encounters and therefore, distinctiveness is less likely to
be a pre-requisite of this form. Rather, several cooperative
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events are accumulated into an emotional score on which the
decision to help is based. Such encounters may involve cus-
tomary activities, such as allogrooming, that strengthen the
social bond (cf. Henzi & Barrett, 1999). Likewise, distinctive-
ness is probably of greater importance to direct and indirect
reciprocity as more information needs to be memorised in
comparison to generalised reciprocity.
Memory and level of details
The level of details required for helping decisions may influ-
ence reciprocity. The more details are needed to make an in-
formed decision to help others (e.g. who, what, when, to whom,
when and howmuch/how often), themore information needs to
be stored, which is likely to be constrained bymemory capacity
decay and interference. Furthermore, the more details need to
be encoded, the more likely episodic memory is involved
(Baddeley, 2001; Crystal, 2010; Tulving, 1972). This is a spe-
cial form of memory that has been extensively studied in jays
and rats and suggested only for few other species (Dere, Kart-
Teke, Huston, & De Souza Silva, 2006). Rats might use epi-
sodic memory when reciprocating help (cf. Crystal, 2018). Rats
can remember several partners over at least 4 days and remem-
ber the specific cooperating experience in combination with the
partner’s identity (Kettler, Schweinfurth, & Taborsky, under
review). However, future studies are needed to investigate the
role of episodic memory in reciprocity among Norway rats.
As discussed in the previous sections, only calculated reci-
procity relies on complex details of cooperative events and thus
seems to require episodic memory. In attitudinal and emotion-
based reciprocity, it seems more likely that help is encoded in
scenes. Memory of such scenes requires a minimum of details
of one or several events and no mental time travel (Rubin &
Umanath, 2015). This form of memory has been shown to be
involved in decisions of apes and zebra finches (Taeniopygia
guttata) (Larose & Dubois, 2011; Lewis et al., 2017). The de-
tails of scenes can be further reduced to a simple association
between an individual and a rewarding act, cooperation, which
is needed for direct and indirect reciprocity. Here, only the
valence of an encounter or a partner, i.e. more or less positive,
is encoded. Almost all species studied have been shown to learn
such associations (Olmstead & Kuhlmeier, 2015a) and thus
may qualify for some forms of reciprocity. Probably the most
extreme example that illustrates how fewmemorised details can
lead to reciprocity is when attitudinal reciprocity underlies gen-
eralised reciprocity. In this situation, the partner’s identity is
unimportant and decisions to help can be solely based on the
valence of the most recent encounter.
Memory and network size
Reciprocity is dependent on the network size (Hizak,
Dmitrovic, & Cubrilo, 2018). While it seems easy to
remember what one partner did over a given period, keeping
track of several partners seems more challenging. Indeed in
lab experiments, people show an increasing error rate, the
more partners need to be remembered, leading to an error rate
of over 20% when trying to keep track of only ten partners
over several rounds (Stevens et al., 2011). This is an important
finding, given that theoretical models demonstrated that reci-
procity is unlikely to evolve, if individuals show error rates of
only 2% in small groups of four individuals (Bowles & Gintis,
2011, pp. 65-66).
At the same time, these findings suggest that either mem-
ory for several partners can be increased or that reciprocity can
be explained by mechanisms other than calculated reciprocity.
Otherwise, we could not explain why reciprocity evolved in
humans because early hominid hunter-gatherer groups already
encompassed more than 30 people (Marlowe, 2005). In addi-
tion, contemporary humans have a social network size of
around 150 individuals (Hill & Dunbar, 2003), which would
make reciprocity basically impossible according to the above
described estimations. There are at least three possibilities that
may enable reciprocity in large groups.
First, memory demands can be lowered to allow coopera-
tion with several partners (reviewed in Moreira et al., 2013).
For example, humans in such lab-based games develop alter-
native strategies, where they only remember rare or distinct
partners, for example remembering the only cheater in a pool
of cooperators (Volstorf, Rieskamp, & Stevens, 2011).
Second, instead of memorising exact helping levels, individ-
uals may choose to cooperate with partners that helped them
and refuse to interact with partners that did not help them, i.e.
partner choice. Importantly, the bigger groups are, the more
likely such partner choice evolves (Kurvers, Krause, Croft,
Wilson, & Wolf, 2014). This would eventually lead to
emotion-based reciprocity, where individuals choose to
cooperate with partners with whom they associate positive
emotions, which reduces the effective group size. Third, it
is also possible that individuals switch between strategies
dependent on their network size, i.e. using estimated
scores when networks are large (generalised reciprocity)
and more exact measurements when networks are small
(direct reciprocity).
Most likely individuals memorise different partners using
anObject File System (Kahneman, Treisman, &Gibbs, 1992).
This cognitive system enables individuals to represent the
exact numerical value of up to four entities or encounters.
Individuals can represent more than just four entities, here
however, the numerical value is approximated, rather than
exact, i.e. Analogue Magnitude System (Kahneman et al.,
1992). In reciprocal interactions, it is needed to encode several
interactions or partners. The exact values of received and giv-
en help are not needed in emotion-based and attitudinal reci-
procity, which can enable reciprocity with more than four
partners. Hard-wired reciprocity, in contrast, most likely
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applies only to dyadic encounters. Given that calculated reci-
procity requires the most information about recent encounters
compared to all other mechanisms of reciprocity, it is most
likely confined to fewer partners.
The memory capacity problem increases if individuals en-
gage in indirect reciprocity. For instance, an individual that
lives with ten partners needs to remember the behaviour of
ten interactions in order to show direct reciprocity. However,
to show indirect reciprocity, the individual needs to remember
45 interactions. Thereby, it might be important to encode not
only whether the observed individual cooperated or defected,
i.e. image strategy (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), but also
whether the interaction partner had cooperated or defected in
a previous encounter (Sugden, 1986), resulting in at least 90
interactions. This shows that third-party evaluations can be
challenging in terms of memory load and has been suggested
to be a driver of brain size in primates (Dunbar, 1992; but see
Healy & Rowe, 2007). Still, there is evidence that cleaner fish
(Labroides dimidiatus) behavemore cooperatively in the pres-
ence of bystanders (Pinto, Oates, & Grutter, 2011) and by-
standers are more likely to approach cleaner fish with a good
image (Bshary & Grutter, 2006). This suggests that large
brains are not necessary for indirect reciprocity, which
can be achieved by different mechanisms. However, indi-
rect reciprocity is unlikely to be explained by calculated
reciprocity, if individuals interact regularly with more than
two partners and their decisions are based on interactions
that are not distinct, emotional or require the memory of
many details.
Processing
In addition to how information is encoded and retrieved, rec-
iprocity is dependent on how such information is processed in
order to return favours. There are three systems possible. First,
individuals may update old information with new information
and thereby base their decisions to help on the most recent
encounter. Second, individuals may accumulate received help
into an overall score, which is the basis for their decision to
help. Third, individuals may calculate and integrate howmuch
a partner has helped them over a given period by adding and
subtracting received and given help, in order to help recipro-
cally. The three systems may be either partner specific, i.e.
direct and indirect reciprocity, or partner unspecific, i.e. gen-
eralised reciprocity.
Updating or replacing information is an integral part of
attitudinal reciprocity and probably the simplest type of pro-
cessing. Updating information is part of almost all animals’
life whenever new information takes precedence, for example
when there is a better mating partner, a new group member, a
different predator or a new food patch that has been discov-
ered. Furthermore, many animals need to update information
about specific partners as they may change over time by
altering their acquired knowledge, hierarchical rank, network
size, mating status, partner quality, physical strength, or their
cooperation level. Hence, updating information, which is
tightly linked to attitudinal reciprocity, lies most
likely within the cognitive capabilities of many species.
Probably more demanding is accumulating information
into one score. Here, information about a partner needs to
be stored and integrated with existing information to pro-
duce an estimated score rather than calculating received and
given help over multiple encounters. This could be
achieved by associating a ‘cooperative’ tag with a partner.
The more often the partners helped an individual, the stron-
ger the association becomes without performing any oper-
ations on the amount of help, i.e. association model
(reviewed in Gallistel & Gibbon, 2001). An accumulation
could be also achieved by memorising single events that are
accumulated by adding one cooperative event to another,
i.e. computational model (reviewed in Gallistel & Gibbon,
2001). Here, individuals may have to potentially add large
numbers of received help into a score, which can be de-
manding. Yet, some species have been shown to add even
large numbers into an approximate score (Beran & Beran,
2004), which are most likely represented as approximate
magnitudes (Kahneman et al., 1992). For instance, many
mammals form social bonds, which are accumulated scores
of positive interactions with specific partners (Massen
et al., 2010; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2012). This shows that
many mammals use partner’s specific scores in their inter-
actions. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that at
least those species may be capable of emotion-based
reciprocity.
Finally, only calculated reciprocity requires computations,
which is, however, within the scope of non-human animals.
Many animals have been shown to perform at least simple
calculations in terms of adding and subtracting (Beran,
2004; Cox & Tamara Montrose, 2016; Olmstead &
Kuhlmeier, 2015b; Pepperberg, 2017; Potrich, Sovrano, &
Vallortigara, 2015). These examples involve only small quan-
tities of up to four items or encounters, and respective calcu-
lations can be explained by an Object File System because it
requires exact calculations (Kahneman et al., 1992). It is pos-
sible that individuals remember specific episodes and inte-
grate this information, for example 'my partner was coopera-
tive in four episodes'. This integrated information can then be
carried forward in a computationally accessible form
(reviewed in Gallistel, 2008). This psychological process,
which might be similar to path integration and cognitive maps,
is likely to require less memory and computational demands
as the exact details of past episodes may be forgotten (Lotem
& Halpern, 2012). Processing information in order to recipro-
cate help, including exact calculations and summary integra-
tions, can be influenced by the quantity and quality of encoun-
ters, which we discuss below.
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Processing and quantity
Decisions to help are dependent on how many encounters
with a partner are used to reciprocate. A meta-analysis in
non-human primates showed that only a small proportion of
received help is paid back immediately (Schino & Aureli,
2016, see also Jaeggi, de Groot, Stevens, & van Schaik,
2013) and studies investigating immediate turn-taking have
not yielded evidence for reciprocity (Melis, Grocke, Kalbitz,
& Tomasello, 2016; Yamamoto & Tanaka, 2009). This indi-
cates that help is usually reciprocated over long time intervals
at least in non-human primates. During such intervals, it is
likely that individuals meet the same or different partners re-
peatedly. Therefore, individuals potentially need to remember
several encounters with single partners.
It is unlikely that non-human animals remember the exact
details of more than four encounters (Kahneman et al., 1992).
Studies on various species showed that individuals can only
represent up to four items or encounters, which is operated by
the Object File System (reviewed in Beran, Parrish, & Evans,
2015). If more than four encounters need to be memorised, the
level of accuracy decreases and details are approximate rather
than exact, which is operated by the Analogue Magnitude
System. This is why many species can easily distinguish be-
tween two and three units, but not between five and seven
(reviewed in Olmstead & Kuhlmeier, 2015b).
Only calculated reciprocity requires the exact details of
multiple encounters. Consequently, calculated reciprocity
might be constrained to four encounters. In contrast to calcu-
lated reciprocity, all other forms of reciprocity either update
previous encounters with the most recent encounter, i.e. hard-
wired and attitudinal, or accumulate positive emotions in an
estimated score, i.e. emotion-based reciprocity. Thereby, exact
details of received help during multiple encounters become
less important or play no role at all. It is yet unclear howmany
details of encounters are needed to deploy the three behav-
ioural strategies. The only strategies that has been investigated
is direct reciprocity, which has been shown to be a stable
strategy when one or two encounters with a partner are con-
sidered (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Boyd & Lorberbaum,
1987).
Processing and quality
Reciprocal decisions involve information not only about the
quantity of help, i.e. providing approximately the same
amount of received help (see above), but also about the quality
of help, i.e. providing approximately the same value of re-
ceived help. However, ensuring a balance of received and
given help can be challenging, especially if exchanges involve
different commodities, such as food for sex. Here, two possi-
bilities are likely. Either animals consider the value of received
help or not. In hard-wired reciprocity, commodities are usually
fixed and there is no variation in commodities differing in
quality. Hence the value is unlikely to influence reciprocity.
All other mechanisms are likely to involve the assessment of
quality and currency conversions to balance received and giv-
en help.
There is evidence that animals can assess and compare
items of different values. For instance, brown capuchin mon-
keys are more likely to trade tokens of lower value with tokens
that result in higher value food (Westergaard, Liv, Rocca,
Cleveland, & Suomi, 2004). In addition, they protest if they
exchange a token with an experimenter that results in a low-
value food item, while the same token results in a high-value
food item for a conspecific (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003).
Furthermore, values may change. Pigeons, for instance, prefer
tokens that result in food under food-restricted conditions but
change their preference to tokens that result in water under
water-restricted conditions. In addition, if given the choice
between specialised and generalised tokens, which can be
exchanged for multiple purposes, they opt for the latter more
flexible option (Defulio, Yankelevitz, Bullock, &
Hackenberg, 2014).
In calculated reciprocity, the value of help might be
encoded as multiplications, for example food is twice as valu-
able as allogrooming. Adding value to such calculations in-
creases the challenges associated with this mechanism, espe-
cially when individuals meet several times and information of
multiple encounters might be confused. In emotion-based and
attitudinal reciprocity, the value of help might be encoded in
the strength of association, i.e. the more valuable the received
help, the stronger the resulting positive association with this
partner and the more or the better help will be provided in
return. Although many animals show reciprocal exchanges
between different services (e.g. Hemelrijk, 1994;
Schweinfurth & Taborsky, 2018b; reviewed in Stevens &
Gilby, 2004) and respond to help differing in value (Dolivo
& Taborsky, 2015), no study of which we are aware has in-
vestigated the psychological processes of how animals use the
value of help in their decisions to reciprocate.
Predicting the occurrence of reciprocity
So far, the literature has focussed mainly on the psychological
processes of calculated reciprocity with the result that reci-
procity per se has been considered to be too cognitively de-
manding for non-human animals (see above). Here, we
showed that calculated reciprocity requires a very specific
set of cognitive capabilities that indeed only a few species
may show. However, there are three other cognitive mecha-
nisms that require less sophisticated skills. We propose that a
more inclusive approach might be more fruitful that encom-
passes all forms of reciprocity and their specific psychological
processes. Based on the mechanisms that we listed above,
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next we make predictions about the circumstances that would
favour each reciprocal behavioural strategy and cognitive
mechanism.
Calculated reciprocity is the most complex mechanism of
reciprocity that also adult humans only rarely use (e.g. Carter,
2014). To date, there has been no convincing evidence of
calculated reciprocity in non-human animals besides one
orang-utan dyad (Amici et al., 2014; Dufour, Pelé,
Neumann, Thierry, & Call, 2009; Pelé et al., 2009). Still, cal-
culated reciprocity can occur, if individuals are able to remem-
ber few distinct encounters with few partners, which poten-
tially induce an emotional response. Furthermore, individuals
must be able to make computations like adding, subtracting
and potentially multiplying units. Because individuals would
have to remember many different interactions when applying
indirect reciprocity, calculated reciprocity is most likely con-
fined to direct reciprocity. Given that many details of encoun-
ters need to be stored, it is most likely that reciprocity is further
confined to short time delays between received and given
help. It might thus be possible that some species show calcu-
lated reciprocity only with unfamiliar partners where calcula-
tions are needed because no other additional information
about the likelihood to reciprocate is available and calcula-
tions are possible because only few encounters have hap-
pened. However, the more often an individual meets a partner,
the more likely they switch to another mechanism because it
becomes difficult to remember several encounters in poten-
tially similar situations. Therefore, an episodic memory might
be replaced by a scene memory or the information might be
accumulated into a social bonding score. We, therefore, pre-
dict that calculated reciprocity may be shown by animals that
form social bonds with group members but that are also highly
tolerant towards unknown individuals to direct affiliative be-
haviours to them according to direct reciprocity.
Emotion-based reciprocity requires less cognitive process-
ing compared to computations, and reduced memory demands
compared to episodic memory. Emotion-based reciprocity can
underlie reciprocity in species that form social bonds, can
experience emotions and are able to accumulate information
into an estimated approximate score. This mechanism most
likely results in direct reciprocity because decisions to help
are based on emotions associated to directly experienced part-
ners with which they have a positive social bond.
Attitudinal reciprocity further lowers the cognitive de-
mands. Attitudinal reciprocity can underlie reciprocity, if in-
dividuals are able to remember single encounters that are part-
ner specific, i.e. in/direct reciprocity, or unspecific, i.e. gener-
alised reciprocity. In addition, individuals need to update old
information with new information. Thereby an estimation, i.e.
Analogue Magnitude System, rather than exact information,
i.e. Object File System, is most likely sufficient for reciprocity.
The memory of recent encounters with several partners may
be enhanced but is not constrained to encounters that involve
distinct situations, emotional reactions or short time delays. If
generalised reciprocity is applied, the memory demands can
be further lowered because only a single encounter needs to be
remembered.We predict to find this mechanism in species that
form groups in which they meet their group members
repeatedly.
Hard-wired reciprocity requires no cognition or emotions
and may explain reciprocity in gregarious individuals that are
unlikely to meet often. Hard-wired reciprocity can underlie
reciprocity, if individuals engage in automatic and immediate
exchanges with one partner. Whether or not the information of
the partner’s identity is integrated in this form of reciprocity is
currently unknown and consequently generalised and direct
reciprocity strategies may be used.
Conclusions and future directions
It has been stated frequently that reciprocity is too cognitively
demanding for non-human animals (Hauser et al., 2009;
Ramseyer et al., 2006; Russell & Wright, 2009; Sánchez-
Amaro & Amici, 2015; Stevens et al., 2005; Stevens &
Gilby, 2004; Stevens & Hauser, 2004, 2005). However, this
perception is based on the idea that there is only one form of
reciprocity that is achieved by one mechanism, i.e. calculated
reciprocity (cf. Carter, 2014; Schino & Aureli, 2010a).
However, here we show that reciprocity encompasses at least
three different strategies that can be underlain by at least four
different mechanisms, that vary dramatically in its psycholog-
ical processes. This shows that reciprocity is a more diverse
phenomenon than currently appreciated and may not be too
cognitively demanding for animals other than humans. Hence,
some forms of reciprocity lay in the range of many species.
We propose that acknowledging this diversity of strategies and
mechanisms, which result in individuals exchanging goods
and services that are contingent on each other, will inform us
about the evolutionary and psychological origins of
reciprocity.
Until now most information on different forms of reciproc-
ity have come from a few species. Therefore, a first step would
be to investigate different strategies and mechanisms in vari-
ous species that fulfil the above described social and cognitive
requirements. For example, to the best of our knowledge, only
one empirical study has provided test subjects with conflicting
partner experiences and therefore tested for the potential inte-
gration of several encounters (Schweinfurth & Taborsky, sub-
mitted). In this study, Norway rats based their decision to help
on the last encounter. Given that this is the only study of this
type so far, it is currently unclear how other non-human ani-
mals encode multiple encounters, which would give insight
into the mechanism they are using to reciprocate. The same
applies to different strategies. Only few studies have tested
whether test subjects help conspecifics according to direct or
Learn Behav
generalised reciprocity, which cannot be distinguished in dy-
adic situations (but see: Carter &Wilkinson, 2013c; Gfrerer &
Taborsky, 2017; Leimgruber et al., 2014; Majolo, Schino, &
Aureli, 2012; Rutte & Taborsky, 2008). Furthermore, by
collecting data on various species, we might be able to con-
duct phylogenetic analyses to test how different forms of rec-
iprocity evolve and whether some might be basal to others (cf.
MacLean et al., 2012).
In addition, brown capuchin monkeys and humans apply
different reciprocal strategies with different mechanisms en-
abling them. This shows that species are not constrained to a
single mechanism or a single strategy. Still, we understand
little about the development of reciprocity, i.e. when individ-
uals use which mechanism to reciprocate help and when they
switch from one to another. A possible experiment would be
to test partners that are unfamiliar or familiar with each other
in a reciprocal paradigm. This would inform us about whether
repeated actions are responsible for changing the mechanism
of reciprocity. Observing the onset of a relationship would
provide additional information on switching points, the devel-
opmental sequence of mechanisms and their connection to
strategies. Another possible experiment could be to present
test subjects with few or many partners in a reciprocal para-
digm that involves few or many interactions with these part-
ners. This would shed light on a flexible use of reciprocal
strategies, for instance, based on group size.
In sum, reciprocity is not cognitively demanding per se.
There are different forms of reciprocity, including different
strategies and mechanisms. The psychological processes vary
between these forms and we showed that complex calcula-
tions are not the only mechanisms through which reciprocity
can be achieved. It is time to acknowledge the diversity of
reciprocal interactions and aim at understanding their evolu-
tionary and psychological origins.
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